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Lokpal Bill: Lessons from 
the Karnataka Lokayukta’s 
Performance
Narayana A, Sudhir Krishnaswamy, Vikas Kumar
The debate on the design of the 
Lokpal has been premised on the 
questionable assumption that 
what is needed to combat 
corruption is a powerful national 
institution to prosecute and 
convict the corrupt, but the 
debate has not drawn on the 
experience with the existing 
institutional models, namely the 
Lokayuktas in the states. An 
empirical analysis of the 
performance of the Lokayukta in 
Karnataka between 1995 and 2011 
suggests that any anti-corruption 
agency, no matter how powerful, 
that is  oriented towards criminal 
conviction is bound to fail in the 
absence of judicial reforms.
1 Introduction
The debate on policy choices and the institutional design for a new anti-corruption agency at the union and 
state levels has pervaded every public fora. 
The ubiquitous debate is characterised by 
passionate disagreement between familiar 
opponents who never tire of restating and 
rehashing their adop ted positions which 
have been informed by their moral or 
political commitments. Even by the stand-
ards of India’s loud and noisy democracy 
the anti-corruption debate has been char-
acterised by a rancour and extra ordinary 
brinkmanship that threatens to derail 
India’s everyday practice of politics.
Despite the polarised debate there is 
agreement on the core moral imperative 
to tackle corruption seriously. However, 
the debate has quickly moved from this 
agreed premise to the questionable conclu-
sion that we need a powerful national insti-
tution to prosecute and convict the corrupt 
under the criminal law. To our knowledge 
the choice of appropriate legal instruments 
to deal with corrup-
tion has not been 
debated. But the idea 
of an anti-corruption 
agency is not a new 
one. It has survived the 
scrutiny of the National 
Com mission to Review 
the Working of the Con-
stitution (2000), two 
Administrative Reforms 
Commissions (1966 
and 2005), four parlia-
mentary standing com-
mittees (1996, 1998, 
2001 and 2011), and review of eight anti-
corruption bills (1968, 1971, 1977, 1985, 
1989, 1996, 1998 and 2001). Half of the 
states and union territories have already 
legislated on, and constituted anti-corrup-
tion agencies. Orissa was the first state to 
legislate on this matter (1970),1 while 
Maharashtra was the first to constitute an 
anti-corruption agency (1972).2 These pre-
ceding policy debates and existing models 
in the states have framed our policy choices. 
But the debate so far has focused exten-
sively on the constitutional status of the 
Lokpal (L M Singhvi coined the word Lok-
pal, which means “Protector of the People”, 
to indigenise the word Ombudsman (Stand-
ing Committee 2011, para 3.3) and the ad-
ministrative and legal mechanisms nec-
essary for a strong and effective agency 
without any attempt to learn from an 
 empirical analysis of the performance of 
existing institutional models.
The best case for a national Lokpal is 
to show that the existing Lokayukta in 
the states works. For instance, it is often 
 argued that the Karnataka Lokayukta, 
constituted under the Karnataka Lokayukta 
Act, 1984, provides an argument for an 
anti-corruption agency at the national 
level. So, it is puzzling that the debate has 
referenced prior bureaucratic discourse 
and the National Crime Record Bureau 
(ncrb) statistics, but there has been no 
syste matic effort to evaluate or assess the 
experience of existing anti-corruption 
agencies in the states. The latest Parlia-
mentary Standing Committee Report’s use 
of anecdotes as empirical evidence exem-
plifies this approach.3
In this article we hope to bring new 
insights to this debate by engaging with 
law in action. Over the last six months, 
researchers at the Azim Premji University’s 
We are grateful to Manavi Belgaumkar, 
Dharmendra Chatur, Tasneem Deo,  
Rajeev Kadambi, Vandana Kamat, and 
Sumandro C for research assistance, to  
P G Babu, Poonam Mehra, V Santhakumar, 
and Alok Tiwari for helpful discussions, and to 
Azim Premji University for institutional 
support. The data used in this study was 
obtained in June 2011 from the public 
information officer, the Karnataka Lokayukta 
under the Right to Information Act, 2005.  
The usual disclaimer applies.
Narayana A (narayana.gatty@
azimpremjifoundation.org), 
Sudhir Krishnaswamy (krishnaswamysudhir@
gmail.com) and Vikas Kumar (vikas.kumar@
azimpremjifoundation.org) are at the Law, 
Governance and Development Initiative,  
Azim Premji University, Bangalore.
Figure 1: Ratio of Raid to Trap Cases (1995-2011)
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Law and Governance Initiative have exam-
ined a comprehensive data set of all raid 
and trap cases handled by Karnataka’s 
Lokayukta between 1995 and 2011. This 
data was obtained under the Right to 
 Information Act 2005. While our final 
analysis and conclusions will follow shortly, 
we hope to contribute to the present 
 debates with our preliminary findings 
through this article. Our analysis suggests 
that the policy debate on the Lokpal has 
 focused on issues that have been anticipated 
and largely resolved by existing legislation 
and institutional design of the Lokayukta 
in, say, Karnataka. It has  ignored critical 
issues that may have little or nothing to do 
with the design of the Lokpal itself but 
 affect its performance. We conclude that a 
bill that does not  assimilate the experience 
of existing anti-corruption agencies in 
states like Karnataka is doomed to fail. The 
rest of the  discussion is organised around 
discrete themes that have been highlighted 
in the current Lokpal debate.
2 Agency Prosecutions  
vs Citizen Complaints
The need to establish a strong Lokpal that 
initiates criminal investigation against 
corrupt officials has been a key demand 
in the current debate. The Karnataka 
Lokayukta had the power, under the 
Preven tion of Corruption Act 1988, to in-
vestigate cases of corruption and recently 
was endowed with suo motu powers 
even under the  Karnataka Lokayukta Act 
to initiate criminal investigation.4 How-
ever, between 1995 and 2011, Karnataka’s 
Lokayukta carried out only 357 suo motu 
raids against individual officials but 
received and tried to trap 2,681 officials 
(and 59 private persons) in response to 
2,159 citizen complaints.5 In other words, 
for every six cases investigated in response 
to citizen complaints only one is initiated 
by the department suo motu. Also, the 
share of raid cases has been decreasing 
over the years (Figure 1, p 12).
So, a comparison between raid and trap 
cases suggests one of the most  active 
Lokayuktas is primarily private com plaint 
driven. This in turn suggests that the legal 
power to initiate action does not determine 
whether we have a proactive anti-corrup-
tion agency. The  incentives for administra-
tive action seem to lie elsewhere. Interest-
ingly, institutional leadership is seen to 
have a significant impact on the agency’s 
performance. For instance, in Karnataka 
more than 66% of the raid cases by the 
Lokayukta were initiated  between 2006 
and 2011, when justice Santosh Hegde was 
the Lokayukta  (Figure 2). Our finding 
agrees with  reports in the media suggesting 
steep changes in Lokayukta’s case load with 
leadership changes (Aiyappa 2011). But 
note that during the period covered in our 
data, raids were conducted under the Pre-
vention of Corruption Act, 1988. The new 
powers conferred by the recent amend-
ments to the Karnataka Lokayukta Act, 
1984 that granted the Lokayukta suo motu 
powers to investigate cases are yet to have 
a signi ficant impact on the  institutional ca-
pacity for proactive  intervention.
3 Departmental Distribution
There have been several estimates of the 
departmental distribution of corruption in 
India. These studies often rely on survey data 
of impressions of the public6 or from self 
Figure 2: Yearly Distribution of Cases Initiated under Karnataka Lokayukta Act, 1984
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Figure 3: Departmental Distribution of Cases (1995-2011)
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disclosure.7 We carried out a department-
wise analysis of cases of corruption to 
map the focus of the Lokayukta’s work 
(Figure 3, p 13).
Interestingly, more than 80% of the trap 
cases are related to four essential func-
tions of government: local government 
(24.06%), administration – taluk/district 
office, police, court, tax, land, revenue 
(37.65%), welfare (17.61%), and regulation 
(2.54%). The rest of the cases are divided 
between agriculture and irrigation (3.76%), 
forests (1.63%), and economic activities 
(12.75%). The corresponding depart-
mental shares for raid cases are as follows: 
 local government (18.21%), administra-
tion (33.24%), welfare (8.09%), regula-
tion (11.56%), agriculture and irrigation 
(8.09%), forests (3.47%), and economic 
activities (17.34%). Two observations are 
in order here. One, the distribution is not 
determined by the Lokayukta as a bulk of 
the cases arise out of citizen complaints. 
Two, given the growing importance of the 
welfare function of the State the overall 
share of essential functions is likely to 
 increase rather than decrease.
Some participants in the debate have 
suggested that structural reform of gov-
ernment – the withdrawal of the state 
from non-core activities – will reduce 
corruption in India. Our preliminary 
analysis suggests that this is not a quick 
fix since at this stage, even a complete 
withdrawal of the State from economic 
activities will have only a marginal im-
pact on the level of corruption measured 
in terms of number of cases of corrup-
tion. So, tackling corruption may require 
a more fundamental restructuring of the 
administrative process as it is unlikely 
that reducing the size of government will 
have a significant impact on the levels 
of corruption.
4 Petty vs Grand Corruption
The distinction between petty and grand 
corruption is a well-established one in the 
academic literature on corruption. It has 
emerged as one of the contentious issues 
in the Lokpal debate with respect to the 
inclusion of Group C and D officials within 
its jurisdiction. Though our data is yet to 
be organised in line with Groups A, B, C 
and D categorisation it allows us to 
respond to this issue with greater insight 
than is currently the case (Figure 4, p 13).
Nearly half of the officials against whom 
the Karnataka Lokayukta has proceeded 
against are officials in the lower bureau-
cratic scale while about 10% are senior 
 officials. Only 24 officials out of 3,038 (0.8%) 
belong to the Indian Administrative Service 
(IAS), the Indian Police Service (IPS),  Indian 
Forest Service, and the Karnataka Admini-
strative Service (kas) cadres. The upshot 
of this discussion is that there is  little 
doubt that the case docket of a Lokpal that 
includes officers of all categories will be 
overwhelmed by cases against the lower 
bureaucracy. While the current debate 
seeks to emphasise the blameworthiness 
and legal culpability of petty and grand 
corruption equally, the institutional impact 
on the allocation of scarce prosecutorial 
resources will be a serious one.8 Further, 
it may be more useful to analyse the 
percentage of prosecuted officers from a 
particular category from among their to-
tal cadre strength but  unfortunately this 
data is unavailable to us at this point.
5 Process of Investigation
The creation of a strong investigation 
and prosecution arm has been central to 
the Indian debate on the Lokpal. It is 
suggested that refusal of sanction for pros-
ecution and the failure of the agency to 
complete investigations are the key prob-
lems that a Lokpal should be designed to 
avoid (see, for instance, the Jan Lokpal 
Bill 2011). In Karnataka, our analysis leads 
to the conclusion that neither of these 
problems is a critical hindrance for the 
anti-corruption agency.
Of all the cases, in 65.9% (43.3%) of the 
trap (raid) cases sanction for prosecution 
was granted (Figure 5). But when seen 
as a function of investigated cases, the 
percentage of cases receiving sanction for 
prosecution goes up to 94.3 (90.5)% of 
trap (raid) cases (Figure 6, p 15). Further, 
the trap (raid) cases in which sanction is 
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yet to be granted are on an average 1.63 
(2.14) years old and the median case in 
this category is two (three) years old. We 
do not have further details about the cases 
in which sanction has not been obtained 
so far. So, we cannot say if the delay in 
these cases can be attributed to political 
and/or bureaucratic interference. Howev-
er, we can say that almost all the raid cas-
es in which sanction is pending involve 
senior officials, including IAS, IPS, and KAS 
cadre officials, and chief engineers. But in 
an overwhelming majority of the cases the 
need for sanction for prosecution has not 
operated as a significant hindrance to the 
functioning of the Lokayukta in Karnataka.
The public debate has also emphasised 
the failure to complete investigations as 
one of the key problems to be resolved in 
the design of the Lokpal. We analysed the 
capacity of the Karnataka Lokayukta to 
resolve this problem within their existing 
legal and bureaucratic framework.
In 80.5% (54.4%) of the trap (raid) cases, 
investigation has been completed and this 
does not vary significantly depending on 
the rank of official being investigated, ex-
cept at the very highest level. This high in-
vestigation rate is particularly impressive. 
The trap (raid) cases pending investigation 
are on an average about 1.1 (2.14) years old 
and the median case in this category is one 
(two) year old. Similarly, charge sheets 
were filed in 97.1% (95.4%) of the trap 
(raid) cases in which investigations have 
been completed and sanction for prosecu-
tion has been obtained. This processing 
rate compares  favourably with the rate at 
which criminal cases in general are proc-
essed in India. The success of the Karnataka 
Lokayukta in investigating cases suggests 
that the  existing legislative and bureaucratic 
framework in Karnataka does not impede 
investigation of corruption offences. The 
Indian public debate on the Lokpal has 
focused extensively on the need to equip 
the institution with extraordinary powers of 
investigation. Our analysis leads to the con-
clusion that much of the Indian debate has 
sought to extinguish a problem that does 
not have a very significant impact on the 
 effectiveness of the anti-corruption agency.
6 Criminal Trial: The Core Problem
On the filing of a charge sheet in a special 
designated court, every case investigated 
by the Lokayukta enters the criminal  justice 
system. We have noted that the perfor-
mance of the Lokayukta in Karnataka has 
been creditable on most parameters dis-
cussed above. However, the story changes 
after charge sheets are filed.
Of the trap (raid) cases in which charge 
sheets have been filed, 95.7% (96.6%) are 
under trial. The average age of the trap 
(raid) cases under trial is 5.1(8) years old 
and the median case in this category in 
four (six) years old. Further, of all the trap 
(raid) cases investigated and under trial 
only 15 (one) have resulted in convictions. 
The conviction rate of 20.5% (20%) in trap 
(raid) cases is much lower than the rate of 
convictions in criminal prosecutions in anti-
corruption cases in India in recent years, 
which is between 34% and 40% (NCRB 
2007, 2008, 2009, Table 9.1, Col 23).9 This 
suggests that this is the key problem that 
lies at the core of a criminal conviction 
model for tackling corruption in India. 
The Indian debate on the Lokpal has 
focused extensively on the remedying insti-
tutional inefficiencies at the complaint and 
investigation stage in the Lokpal. No matter 
how successful these innovations are, they 
will not tackle the core problem with a 
criminal trial in India: the trial stage.10
7 Is Karnataka’s Lokayukta a 
Successful Model?
As the above discussion shows, if criminal 
conviction is used as the measure of suc-
cess then the best Lokayukta in the coun-
try is undoubtedly a failure. But a caveat is 
in order: the Lokayukta does not adminis-
tratively control the criminal court. Hence, 
we should attribute this failure to the 
choice of a criminal conviction model as 
the centrepiece of our anti-corruption 
strategy. Alternatively, the performance of 
the Lokayukta may be assessed by estimat-
ing its political and symbolic impact. While 
we do not have data to systematically 
evaluate the function of the Karnataka 
Lokayukta, maybe the Lokayukta’s capacity 
to occupy media attention through the 
spectacle of the raid and high profile 
investigations into politically charged cases 
that have unseated a chief minister, shifted 
the public mood and  enhanced political 
accountability, and could be counted as 
significant successes. However, we should 
not overstate these effects because the 
ruling party’s candidates have routinely 
won most by-elections to the Karnataka 
legislative assembly in the  recent past. A 
third potential measure of success of the 
Lokayukta as an anti-corruption agency 
may be its capacity to initiate and affect 
administrative measures against officials, 
including recovery of damages. At this 
stage we do not have the data to estimate 
or assess these effects and this will be 
the emphasis for future  research. A final 
assessment of the Lokayukta in Karnataka 
would need a more  fully developed nor-
mative framework for assessment. How-
ever, even at this stage we may conclude 
that the Lokayukta fails to achieve its 
primary purpose: the criminal conviction 
of corrupt officials.
8 Concluding Remarks
The presumption of a criminal conviction 
model is at the core of the Lokpal Bill, 
which means that it will come up against 
the same environmental limits – the effi-
cacy of the criminal justice system – that 
the Lokayukta in Karnataka confronts. 
Without highly contentious legal reforms, 
an extremely powerful agency, which the 
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Jan Lokpal Bill promises to establish, can 
at best marginally improve investigation 
rates and filing of charge sheet in corrup-
tion cases without securing more convic-
tions. The proposal for the Lokpal at the 
moment fails to address this core problem 
and for that reason is bound to fail to 
achieve its primary purpose: the criminal 
conviction of corrupt officials.
Notes
 1 Orissa Government (nd).
 2 Standing Committee (2011, para 3.8).
 3 Standing Committee (2011, passim) and Stark (2011).
 4 Section 7(1)(b) of the Karnataka Lokayukta Act, 
1984 as amended by the Karnataka Lokayukta 
(Amendment) Act, 2010.
 5 In a raid case, the police wing of the Lokayukta 
raids the office and/or residential premises of a 
public servant to ascertain disproportionate  assets. 
In a trap case, the Lokayukta police lay a trap to 
catch the public servants red-handed in the act of 
accepting a bribe. The latter is initiated in response 
to complaints, while the former is based on the 
 intelligence collected by the Lokayukta police.
 6 See, for instance, Transparency International (2005).
 7 See, for instance, iPaidaBribe.com (nd) and Paul 
and Shah (1997).
 8 Inadvisability of treating petty and grand corrup-
tion alike and using the same agencies and legal 
instruments to deal with them has been questioned 
for quite some time (e g, Rowat 1984; Panchu 2011).
 9 Conviction rate is calculated by dividing the cases 
resulting in conviction by the total number of cases 
in which trial has been completed and judgment 
passed. Of all the cases, the share of cases leading 
to conviction is close to 0.5%.
10 Again, this issue has been discussed for long. See, 
for instance, Palmer (1985), Alexander (1995), 
and Quah (2003).
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From Parliamentary  
to Paramilitary Democracy
Sumanta Banerjee
India’s atrocious record with 
regard to the human rights of 
its citizens suggests that, with 
parliamentary complicity, it is 
degenerating to the status of a 
paramilitary democracy.
All through the politically phoney and financially wasteful filibuster-  ing on the floors of the Lok Sabha 
in the recent winter session, neither the 
treasury benches nor the opposition cared 
to remember one particular date during 
that session – 10 December, World Human 
Rights Day. Yet, all other United Nations-
mandated dates – like International Wom-
en’s Day on 8 March, World Population Day 
on 11 July, International Literacy Day on 8 
September – are observed with a lot of fan-
fare by the Indian government by giving 
away awards to functionaries for carrying 
out the tasks under those respective UN 
mandates. That New Delhi keeps out 10 De-
cember from its list of similar  official cere-
monies is indicative of the  Indian state’s 
unease over its atrocious record with regard 
to the human rights of its citizens. In contrast 
with its acts of  rewarding non-governmental 
organisations and individuals under other 
UN-sponsored social reformist program-
mes, the Indian government punishes citi-
zens who assert their rights under the UN’s 
 Human Rights charter.
The UN Human Rights Council will re-
view India’s human rights record during 
the last four years when it holds its session 
in mid-2012. Meanwhile, the Working 
Group on Human Rights (WGHR), a coali-
tion of Indian human rights organisations, 
has submitted to the UN a report which 
 exposes the atrocities carried on by the 
 Indian state behind the façade of a parlia-
mentary democracy. It records incidents 
which are already known to us – 789 extra-
judicial killings in Manipur between 2007 
and 2010; the discovery of about 2,700 un-
marked graves of people killed by the In-
dian security forces in Kashmir. When 
speaking of Kashmir, we should also add 
that the  Association of Parents of Dis-
appeared Persons (APDP) in a recent sub-
mission to the Jammu and Kashmir State 
Human Rights Commission, has acknow-
ledged that  besides Indian security forces, 
Islamic militant groups have also whisked 
away their sons (The Hindu, 12 December 
2011). This brings us to the other important 
issue of the culpability of extra-state agen-
cies in the violation of human rights in 
